A covert communications network is a connected, overlay, peer-to-peer network being used to support communications within a group in which the survival of the group depends on (a) confidentiality and anonymity for communications, (b) concealment of participation in the network to both other members of the group and external eavesdroppers, and (c) resilience against disconnection. These requirements are much more stringent than for typical privacy and anonymity systems. In order to protect the network from subversion of individual nodes, neighbors of failed nodes have to be isolated from the network as well. Thus, all failures have to treated as neighborhood failures. Network membership is protected through topology management in order to limit each participant's knowledge of the network addresses (IP address, email address, etc.) of other participants. In this paper, we propose a measure for determining the suitability of random topologies for use in a covert communication network, and we use this measure to analyze the suitability of Erdös-Rényi Random Graphs for use in a covert communication network.
Introduction
The anonymity and privacy provided by public anonymity networks, such as Tor, are being increasingly targeted by government agencies [1] [2] [3] [4] . Any anonymity network that has central servers for advertising entry and exit nodes will continue to be particularly vulnerable. To prevent censorship by government agencies and surveillance of participants by third parties in general, anonymity networks must provide membership concealment as well: the identities of members of the anonymity network are concealed both from third parties that are not members and from other members. We call networks that provide anonymity and membership concealment covert communication networks (CCNs). Such networks can be realized using peer-to-peer networks (P2P) employing mix-based anonymity protocols as long as the network grows in a distributed manner. Such networks provide a high-level of membership-concealment by limiting the connections between nodes within the network to personal relationships that already exist outside the network 5 . CCNs rely on the topology of the network to provide both membership-concealment and resilience against disconnection 6, 7 . In this paper, we provide a measure for analyzing random topologies for their usefulness in CCNs. Given the membership-concealment restrictions in a CCN, whenever the failure or subversion of an individual node is detected, its neighboring nodes must be considered as "tainted" and must be deleted from the CCN as well. This failure mode is known as neighborhood failure and gives raise to quality criteria that are different than traditional single-node failures. (Fully-connected networks, for example, perform very poorly for neighborhood failures, because the failure of any single node brings down all the nodes.)
We define in 6, 7 the subversion impedance as a measure to capture the effect of neighborhood failures in a CCN. We show that for small numbers of nodes, covert network graphs can be constructed that have optimal subversion impedance. Unfortunately, no deterministic construction method is known that is either scalable or that does not divulge large numbers of members in the network whenever a new node joins. It is therefore important to understand the quality (in our case the subversion impedance) of typical random topologies that emerge from nodes joining in a CCN.
Random topologies (in particular Erdös-Rényi random graphs) are important in the study of CCNs because of the difficulties in managing the membership of the CCN: when a new node joins a CCN, the communication must be as local and as sparse as possible in order to not unduly divulge information about newly joining or existing members of the network. As it turns out, the Erdös-Rényi construction produces the topology of a network where connections are established uniformly at random with a probability independent from every other edge. In this paper, we assume that this property can be used to create topologies that minimize the sharing of network addresses among CCN participants thus limiting the capability of an adversary from gaming the join protocol in order to maximize their knowledge of the network addresses of other participants in the network.
We are interested in the risk incurred by the average node when a node is subverted, uniformly, at random, as well as the case when the attacker targets and subverts a node in order to maximize the damage. Thus, we specify the expected subversion impedance as a measure of the risk incurred by a random node and the expected worst-case subversion impedance as the risk incurred by a node in the worst case for all graphs G ∈ G n .
Expected Subversion Impedance
Observing that the survival of a CCN depends on both the number of surviving nodes and on their connectivity, we define in 6, 7 the subversion impedance of a covert communications network as the product of the ratio of surviving nodes (the secrecy) and the ratio of the surviving connectivity (the resilience) of the surviving network with respect to the network before the failure.
Let G be a covert communication graph, and let H(G, v) denote the survivor graph after the failure of node v and its neighborhood. We further denote by κ(G) the connectivity of graph G. The subversion impedance of communication graph G with respect to failure of node v is denoted as γ(G, v), where:
and the worst-case subversion impedance as γ * (G), where:
If any subverted node in G produces a disconnected graph, then γ * (G) = 0. We refer to the worst-case survivor graph as
Consider a random graph processes, G, in which a random graph evolves as the number of nodes, n, increases. We refer to the set of possible random graphs on n nodes as a family of random graphs denoted by G n .
Definition 1. The expected subversion impedance, E[γ(G)], is the expected value of the subversion impedance,
where Pr(G) is the probability G occurs within G n .
By extension, we can define both the expected secrecy measure and the expected resilience measure.
Definition 2. The expected secrecy for all graphs G ∈ G n is:
where E[d(v)] is the expected degree of node v ∈ V within the network topology, G(V, E)
Definition 3. The expected resilience for all graphs G ∈ G n is:
We would like to be able to easily estimate the expected subversion impedance on random graphs from G n . Of course, since higher connectivity implies larger neighborhoods,
Thus, in order to calculate the expected subversion impedance from the expected secrecy and the expected resilience, we use the following equation:
In order to determine the expected secrecy, the expected degree is easily calculated for many types of random topologies. However, the expected resilience is much more difficult to calculate. We can apply Jenson's inequality 8 on the expected resilience measure to get a lower bound on the expected resilience. Let E[κ(G)] be the expected vertex connectivity on a graph G ∈ G n and let E[κ(H(G, v))] be the expected connectivity of a survivor graph H(G, v) ∈ H(G n ), where H(G n ) is the set of survivor graphs generated from the removal of a random closed neighborhood from a graph in G n . Then
From here, we need to establish the closeness of this bound, look for ways to estimate the vertex connectivity, and determine the covariance between E[S (G, v)] and E[K (G, v) ]-all of which are dependent on the particular random graph process used.
Expected Worst-Case subversion Impedance
Even in random topologies, we are still concerned about worst-case subversions. In assessing a randomized graph process, the expected worst-case subversion impedance will measure the expected worst-case. 
where Pr(G) is the probability of G being occurring within the family, G n .
In the following, we analyze Erdös-Rényi random graphs in order to determine their suitability as CCN topologies and develop a closed-form estimate for the expected subversion impedance for Erdös-Rényi random graphs. 
Erdös-Rényi Random Graphs
Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graphs, or G n,p and G n,M graphs, are random undirected graphs with n nodes 9 . In G n,p graphs, each edge exists with an independent probability p. On the other hand, in G n,M graphs, M edges are selected, uniformly at random, from the n(n − 1)/2 possible edges.
In both types of graphs, the edge degree is binomially distributed. Since the secrecy measure is a function of the node degree, the secrecy measure is also binomial. Thus, for a graph G ∈ G n,p and s ∈ [0, 1], the probability that S (G, v) = s is described by:
where ψ = s(n − 1). This gives the probability distribution of secrecy values across a graph G ∈ G n,p . Since this is a discrete distribution, the value s must be chosen such that ψ ∈ N. Otherwise ψ can be rounded off to the nearest integer. Thus, we can calculate the expected secrecy from Eq.(5):
These types of graphs are not guaranteed to be connected for small values of p and n. We assume that G is connected. In connected topologies that are either very sparse or dense, there is a high probability that the removal of a closed neighborhood disconnects the network. In either case, γ * (G) = 0. Fig.1 shows the results of simulations to calculate the expected subversion impedance for the G n,p graph process as n increases from 10 to 100 (increments of 5) for p = 0.15, p = 0.25 and p = 0.35. These results were generated by averaging over 100 simulations for each increment of n and p. The figure shows that the expected subversion impedance is higher for the smallest value of p.
Results for the Expected Subversion Impedance
When generating random graphs in our simulations, we discarded any G ∈ G n,p that was not connected. Of course, for low values of p and n, the higher the probability that the generated graph was disconnected, and discarded. While this may skew the results based on degree distribution and vertex connectivity, our measures are only meaningful is the starting topologies are connected. As n increases, even for low p, the probability that the generated graph is disconnected lowers, which results in a decreasing number of graphs being discarded, which in turn leads to less skew. (8) for each value of p with increasing n. In each case the simulation results quickly settle to the closed-form results. Unsurprisingly, the lower the value of p, the higher the expected secrecy, since the neighborhoods within the topology are smaller. Of course, determining the expected secrecy is computationally expensive given that the vertex connectivity must be calculated for the original topology, G, and every potential survivor graph, H (G, v) . Thus, if we could determine a closed-form equation for calculating the expected secrecy, we could evaluate E[K (G, v) ] for arbitrarily large topologies. A step in this direction would be to use the result from Bollobás that, for a fixed p, 0 < p < 1, for almost every graph G ∈ G n,p , κ(G) = δ(G) 9 . Now, we can modify Eq. (6) to become
Results for the Expected Secrecy

Results for the Expected Resilience
where
E[δ(G)] and E[δ(H(G, v))]
are the expected minimum degree for graph G ∈ G n,p and the survivor graph H(G, v) ∈ H(G n,p ), respectively. In Fig.4 , the solid plots represent the simulation results for E [K(G, v) ], as in Fig.3 . The hollow plots represent the lower bound of Eq.
(9). For the latter, E[δ(G)] and E[δ(H(G, v))]
are determined by averaging the minimum degree from the graphs generated in the simulations for each p and n. From the simulation results, when n = 100, E
[δ(H(G, v))]/E[δ(G)] was within 1% of E[K(G, v)] for all tested values of p. The lower bound is very tight and seems to converge to E[K(G, v)] as n increases. Thus, Eq.(9) seems to provide a good estimate for E[K(G, v)].
Towards a Closed Form for E[δ(G)]
Bollobás identifies several results related to vertex connectivity in G n,p and G n,M graphs in 9 . However, none of these results provided an approach for estimating the expected connectivity or the expected minimum vertex degree. We can, however, apply a series of results from order statistics 10 , from which we can calculate the expected minimum from a set of n samples from a binomial distribution. For example, it is known that, for G ∈ G n,p ,
where F(x; n, p) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the binomial distribution 10 . In this expression, the term μ 1:n is used to denote the expected smallest value in a sample of n elements. Fig.5 shows the error between the calculated estimates from simulation, E[δ(G)] sim , and the expectation as calculated from Eq.(10). For n = 100, the calculated estimates have an error of just over 2%, but which quickly falls off. For n ≥ 1000, all test values (p ∈ [0.15, 0.35]) have an error of less than 1%. In fact, with these results, we assume that, as n increases,
Using Eq. (9) 
gives us a good estimate for E[δ(G)] for large n, but what about E[δ(H(G, v))]?
We know the expected number of nodes in H(G, v), but does Eq.(9) still give a good estimate for the connectivity of the survivor graph?
as n → ∞.
Proof of Theorem. The proof is omitted due to lack of space. It can be found in 11 .
Thus, given the expected number of nodes in the survivor graph and the value for p, we can calculate an estimate for E [δ(H(G, v) )] which improves as n grows. Now, we show how to use the estimates developed above to develop a closed-form estimate for E[γ (G, v) ].
Towards a Closed Form Estimate for E[γ(G, v)]
With the results above, we use Eq. (10) 
where μ 1:n denotes the expected minimum value of the connectivity over the n nodes in the survivor graph where Fig.3) , with the closed-form estimates calculated using Eq.(13) (solid plots). We see the lower bound hold for n ≥ 30, and as n increases, we see a convergence between the two plots.
Referring back to Eq. (5), we have closed-form equations for E[S (G, v)] (Eq. (8)) and E[K(G, v)] (Eq. (13)). We now examine the covariance between these two values. Fig.7 shows the expected covariance as calculated from simulations generated as the average of 100 simulations for each value of p and range n with n incremented by 10 at each step. First, the results show that the covariance is positive. Given this result and Eq.(13), we have
Second, the results show that the covariance seems to be independent of p as the plots for each p and each n seem to be identical. Third, as n increases, the covariance decays at an exponential rate. For G ∈ G n,p with n > 30,
01. Thus, as n increases, the expected secrecy and expected resilience seem to become more and more independent. Thus, assuming that . We see a quick convergence between these two values for topologies as small as n = 30 (less than 10% error). At n = 100, we have only 1% error between the simulation results and the closed-form estimate.
Results for the Expected Worst-Case Subversion Impedance
Whereas the estimate for E[δ(G n,p )] derived above works well as a basis for estimating E[γ(G n,p )], it will not suffice for estimating the expected worst-case subversion impedance. An approach for a closed-form estimate for E[γ * (G n,p )] could use an approach similar to that used above, but the focus would need to be on finding a good estimate for E[δ(H(G, v * ))]. In Fig.9 , the expected worst-case subversion impedance is shown as calculated based on simulations (the average of 100 randomly generated, connected graphs from G n,p with, as before, 10 ≤ n ≤ 100 and p = 0.15, p = 0.25, and p = 0.35, respectively. We see that when n ≤ 60, E[γ * (G n,p )] is lowest when p = 0.15. However, as n continues to increase, a low value for p proves to be best. 
Conclusions
Our analysis was motivated by 12 where Albert, Jeong, and Barabási compare the effects of random and worst-case attacks in Erdös-Rényi random graphs and scale-free random graphs as single nodes are removed. Likewise, we examine the effects of neighborhood failures on Erdös-Rényi random graphs in both the random and worst case. We defined measures for assessing the suitability of a random topology for a CCN. With these measures, we analyzed Erdös-Rényi Random Graphs and determined a closed-form estimate for the expected subversion impedance of G n,p graphs. Future work will involve analyzing the subversion impedance for the family of scale-free random graphs using the Barabási-Albert (BA) construction. However, given the degree distribution for a BA constructed scale-free topology, we anticipate the expected worst-case subversion impedance to be significantly lower than that of G n,p graphs. The homogenous nature of G n,p graphs should make them less vulnerable to catastrophic damage resulting from neighborhood failures.
